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Abstract—The project Automated Unmanned Protective Vehicle
for Highway Hard Shoulder Road Works (aFAS) aims to develop
an unmanned protective vehicle to reduce the risk of injuries due
to crashes for road workers. To ensure functional safety during
operation in public traffic the system shall be developed following
the ISO 26262 standard. After defining the functional range in
the item definition, a hazard analysis and risk assessment has to
be done. The ISO 26262 standard gives hints how to process this
step and demands a systematic way to identify system hazards.
Best practice standards provide systematic ways for hazard
identification, but lack applicability for automated vehicles due to
the high variety and number of different driving situations even
with a reduced functional range. This contribution proposes a
new method to identify hazardous events for a system with a
given functional description. The method utilizes a skill graph
as a functional model of the system and an overall definition of
a scene for automated vehicles to identify potential hazardous
events. An adapted Hazard and Operability Analysis approach
is used to identify system malfunctions. A combination of all
methods results in operating scenes with potential hazardous
events. These can be assessed afterwards towards their criticality.
A use case example is taken from the current development phase
of the project aFAS.
I. SCOPE OF WORK
The project Automated Unmanned Protective Vehicle for
Highway Hard Shoulder Road Works (aFAS1) aims to develop
an unmanned protective vehicle to reduce the risk of injuries
by crashes for road workers. The unmanned protective vehicle
follows a leading vehicle in a defined distance on the hard
shoulder of a highway without a safety driver or human
supervision. On- and off-ramps are passed in very close
distance to the leading vehicle. A detailed outline of the project
aFAS and the main objectives are described in [1]. Despite
the operation on a hard shoulder of a highway this project
aims to show the first operation of an unmanned vehicle in
public traffic on German roads. Due to safety criticality the
system shall be developed applying the ISO 26262 standard [2]
for ensuring functional safety. The project is currently in the
concept phase of the reference development process proposed
by the ISO 26262 standard, which is shown in Figure 1.
After defining the range of features and the functional system
1German abbreviation for Automatisch fahrerlos fahrendes Absicherungs-
fahrzeug fu¨r Arbeitsstellen auf Autobahnen
Vehicle Level Hazard
Analysis
Vehicle level hazards
Risk assessment
Item Definition: 
Functional range and
System boundaries
Fig. 1. Concept phase of ISO 26262 standard (simplified) with process steps
(rounded) and work products (cornered) [2, Part 3]
boundaries in the item definition, the system is inspected with
regards to criticality during operation and the risk to other
traffic participants in the hazard analysis and risk assessment
(HARA). The first step of the HARA is the scene analysis
(for a definition of the term scene see [3] and Section IV-C),
which shall identify operational scenes where malfunctioning
behavior of the system can lead to mishaps which are called
potential hazardous events. The ISO 26262 standard uses the
term situation which equals the term scene defined in [3] and is
called scene for this contribution. These scenes thus describe
the correct use and the misuse of the item in a foreseeable
way. A methodology for the identification of such scenes is
the main focus of this contribution.
According to the ISO 26262 standard, the hazardous events
“shall be determined systematically by using adequate tech-
niques” and “based on the item’s functional behaviour; there-
fore, the detailed design of the item does not necessarily
need to be known.” [2, Part 3] The proposed techniques
are brainstorming, checklists, quality history, Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and field studies [2, Part 3].
Due to the variety of operational situations, non-structured
brainstorming and checklists do not seem to be a legitimate
way for covering all relevant situations. A quality history or
field studies are not available because the unmanned protective
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vehicle will be the first of its type, therefore examples of
current protective vehicles can be used as a base. It has to
be noticed that the major difference that no human operator
is available in the vehicle leads to other (more or different)
hazardous events. The classical FMEA needs a detailed design
of the analyzed system, which per definition is not available
in the concept phase. A review of the ISO 26262 standard by
Van Eikema Hommes points out that “the lack of guidance
on hazard identification and elimination hinders the standards
ability to sufficiently provide safety assurance” [4]. For these
reasons this contribution proposes a novel systematic method
for the identification of potential hazardous events for the
unmanned protective vehicle.
II. UNDERSTANDING OF THE TERM HAZARD FOR
AUTOMATED VEHICLES
The ISO 26262 standard defines a hazard as “potential
source of harm (1.56) caused by malfunctioning behavior
(1.73) of the item (1.69)”, where harm is “physical injury or
damage to the health of persons”. Malfunctioning behavior is
defined as a “failure (1.39) or unintended behavior of an item
(1.69) with respect to its design intent” [2, Part 1]. According
to Ericson [5] a hazard is a “before” state which transits to a
mishap (or accident) through hazardous components and risk
factors (Fig. 2). Ericson further states that a hazard consists of
MishapHazard State                Transition
Elements
- Hazardous Components
- Risk Factors
„Before“ state
Potential 
conditions
„After“ state
Actual
Consequences
Fig. 2. Coherence of hazard and mishap according to [5]
hazardous elements, initiating mechanisms and targets in the
so called hazard triangle (Fig. 3). Following this definition and
structure of a hazard, the malfunctioning behavior results from
hazardous elements. These elements cause mishaps because of
initiating mechanisms (hazardous events). The main objective
of the HARA is to identify all components of the triangle
and afterwards to remove or mitigate at least one of the
components for each hazardous event in the functional safety
concept.
Fig. 3. Hazard triangle [5]
Applying these definitions to vehicle guidance systems,
the targets are other traffic participants and occupants of
an automated vehicle. There are three types of targets as
ISO 26262 standard defines harm as damage or injury to per-
sons: other vehicles including occupants, cyclists and pedes-
trians. The physical hazardous element is kinetic energy of
the host vehicle and other traffic participants. This energy is
influenced or regulated by functions, which are provided by
the system. Because there is no detailed technical solution
available in the concept phase of development, functions
are meant as an abstract description and not implemented
functions. The initiating mechanisms can be a malfunctioning
behavior of the system or operation of the vehicle guidance
system outside its functional system boundaries including the
operational environment and weather. Malfunctioning behavior
itself cannot cause any harm without a scene including the
environment of the vehicle which it is operating in. To
complete the representation of a hazard, the whole scene or at
least the relevant components around the vehicle have to be
described. This information can be taken or generated from
the item definition and serve as input for the hazard analysis.
III. RELATED WORK
The related work in the field of hazard analysis and hazard
identification for automated vehicles is separated into two sec-
tions, because there is some recent work and many standards
available. The recent work provides an overview of current
activities regarding the ISO 26262 standard and the traditional
techniques section lists related standards.
A. Recent work
Different authors [6] [7] propose the scene-situation-matrix
to identify hazardous events, but provide no method how to
generate a complete set of relevant scenes for the item except
expert knowledge in brainstorming. This matrix can be used
as a preliminary hazard identification method which contains a
first guess of the system-risk. Luo et al. [8] propose a modeling
approach for safety case reasoning which covers hazardous
events but do not mention how these events are generated.
Cuenot et al. [9] provide a model based-safety analysis for
the system development phase in the ISO 262626 standard [2,
Part 4]. The system development phase is based on the concept
phase and provides a detailed system design. But it needs
a functional safety concept to implement, which is derived
from the HARA and the safety analysis in the concept phase.
Concluding the recent publications in the automotive domain,
there seems to be potential towards systematic identification
of hazards based on a functional system description.
B. Traditional hazard analysis techniques
1) Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP):
The Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) is a
structured technique for examining a defined system, with the
objective of identifying potential hazards in the system and
identifying potential operability problems with the system
[10]. Originally developed by the Institute of Chemical
Industry (ICI) in the early 1970s [11], HAZOP studies were
intended to analyze chemical plants. Over the years HAZOP
was applied to other fields like nuclear power plants, the
petroleum industry, food and water industries and railways.
The key idea of HAZOP is to bring an interdisciplinary team
together to assess proposed system deviations which are
generated by combining an item with system parameters and
specified guide words. An example is a valve which generates
too much flow, where valve is the item, flow is the parameter
and too much are the guide word(s). The HAZOP method
seems not to be applicable to vehicular systems without
any modifications, because there are no guide words for the
specific tasks of an automated vehicle available in the standard.
2) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA):
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used
to identify effects on the operability of the system caused
by failures in subsystems, hardware components or system
functions [12]. Originally developed by the U.S. military
in 1949 [5], the standard was adapted for the automotive
industry by the Ford Motor Company and was consolidated
in 1993 by the Automotive Industry Action Group (AIAG).
Ericson [5] describes an analysis based on a functional
model which describes what the system does and not how
the functions are implemented in hard- and software. This
design FMEA (DFMEA) should be initiated right after the
project start and during the concept phase. DFMEA depends
on design-responsibility, interfaces and interactions and the
architecture of the system. The architecture can be expressed
with block diagrams, interface diagrams, functional diagrams,
structure trees and schematic illustrations. The item definition
provides the information to get a functional model for the
item under investigation. Based on this information the
system functions (e.g. transforms, operates, contains) are
expressed by requirements. The analysis process identifies
which components can fail and how this failure affects the
requirements. “The effects of the failure mode should be
considered against the next level up assembly, the final
product, and the end customer when known.”[12] The
difficulty for a driverless vehicle at the system level is to
identify a complete or at least representative set of scenes
where the effects can be investigated. The (D)FMEA does
not cover effects on the environment but can give hints how
the system fails.
3) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA):
The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive method for
finding (basic) causes for unwanted events (malfunctions or
malfunctioning behavior) in the system. For this analysis a
given effect of a system failure is analyzed in a Fault Tree to
identify the components which can cause the effect [13]. The
FTA can be used to assess which components in the system
can cause the malfunctioning behavior in a hazardous event.
Fault Trees are derived from a detailed system design and are
developed mainly for hardware analysis and a calculation of
fault rates. The functional safety concept, which is developed
after the HARA, then shall mitigate or prevent failures in the
identified system components.
4) Event Tree Analysis (ETA):
The Event Tree Analysis (ETA) builds Event Trees, which
are investigated according to the effect on the system (item)
[14]. This method evaluates if the implemented safety mech-
anisms reduce or prevent the hazard from occurring. The
ISO 26262 standard demands from the hazard analysis and risk
assessment that it should be processed without “safety mech-
anisms intended to be implemented or that have already been
implemented in predecessor items shall not be considered” [2,
Part 3]. The ETA can be used to assess whether a functional
safety concept is able to prevent or mitigate hazardous events
but not to identify them.
IV. APPROACH FOR IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIAL
HAZARDOUS EVENTS
This section introduces the novel approach for identifying
potential hazardous events (cf. Fig 4). The following parts
show which entities were chosen to identify the events for
the described unmanned protective vehicle. A hazardous event
consists of the current operating mode which is performed,
a function with a specific malfunction and the current scene
around the vehicle. The next sections show how to identify
these parts systematically and which values were chosen for
the identification in the project aFAS.
Mal-
functions
Operating 
modes
Parts of
scene
Potential hazardous events
Relevant events
Hazardous events
Skill graph
Item definition
HAZOP
Combination in Database
Discre-
tization
Automated assessment and reduction
Expert assessment and hazard identification
Fig. 4. Proposed methodology for identification of potential hazardous events
with work products (cornered) and process steps (rounded)
A. Operating Modes
The vehicle guidance system of the unmanned protective
vehicle is planned to operate in four modes [1]. The first
one is the Manual Mode, in which the unmanned protective
vehicle is controlled by a human and acts like a normal vehicle.
There is no operation of the vehicle guidance system in this
HMI
Unmanned
Protective Vehicle
Engine
Select rele-
vant object
Perceive ele-
vated objects
Radar Longrange Radar Shortrange
Perceive lane
boundaries
Camera
Determine
target pose
Gearbox SteeringBrakes
Accelerate Decelerate Yaw
Plan trajectory
Follow trajectory
Select lead-
ing vehicle
Show current
operating mode
Receive leading
vehicle states
Process mode
change request
Switch oper-
ating mode
Get current
velocity
Inertial sensors
Radio interface
Follow leading
vehicle (wide)
Follow leading
vehicle (close)
Get current pose
Fig. 5. Skill graph of the unmanned protective vehicle categorized in main (grey), perception (green), planning (light blue), action (orange), sensors (blue),
actuators (red) and input-output (purple), HMI: Human Machine Interface
mode. When the unmanned protective vehicle is located at
the working spot, the mode has to be switched to Safe Halt.
In this mode the vehicle comes to a stop within the smallest
possible distance or stands still. This is used as the operational
safe mode in case of a system failure or to start automated
operation. The automated driving functions are operated in
Follow Mode and Coupled Mode. Passing of acceleration and
deceleration lanes is done in the Coupled Mode, in which
the unmanned protective vehicle drives with a very small gap
between the two vehicles. In this mode the leading vehicle’s
current states of actuators are sent to the unmanned protective
vehicle via the radio interface to enable the operation in such
close gaps. This functionality is based on the work of the
KONVOI [15] project. Follow Mode is planned to be the main
operation. In this mode the unmanned protective vehicle has
a gap of about 100 m to the leading vehicle. It acts like an
adaptive cruise control with stop and go feature and follows
the hard shoulder like a lane keeping system.
B. Functions and malfunctions
According to Fig. 1 the item definition is the input for
the HARA defining the unmanned protective vehicle in a
functional way including system boundaries and operational
environment. From this informal document a skill graph,
which describes the functionality with all dependencies, can
be created. In this case a skill is an abstract description of
an activity which the system has to provide to fulfill the
intended task [16]. The item definition describes a system
by the functional behavior and the system goals or mission.
Note that there should be no technical concepts in this part
of the development process. The system goals can then be
divided into several sub-activities which have dependencies
on each other. For example has the task following a lane
dependencies on perceiving a lane and control the vehicles
dynamic state. By modeling skills in a graph the system can
be described from top-level goals or purpose over functional
(and non-technical) dependencies to bottom sinks and sources
which describe system boundaries. Reschka et al. investigated
the concept of skill graphs for appliance in vehicle guidance
systems [17]. Note that the terms skills and abilities were
interchanged. Fig. 5 shows the resulting skill graph, which
was extracted from the item definition. For the purpose of
describing vehicle guidance systems, the skills are separated
into seven different categories:
• System skill (grey)
• Sensors (blue)
• Actuators (red)
• Input-Output (e.g. HMI) (purple)
• Perception skills (green)
• Planning skills (light blue)
• Action skills (orange)
The main or system skill describes the system itself and covers
the overall functionality. The underlying skills describe the
system in a hierarchical way. Beginning from the main tasks
(following the lead vehicle and switching operating modes)
in the different operating modes. Skills are connected with
arrows showing their dependencies to each other. For example
the skill select relevant object has dependencies on a skill
which perceives the object and another which perceives the
hard shoulder boundaries to identify if an object is relevant or
not.
To identify possible malfunctions we use the categorization
of skills in combination with an adopted HAZOP methodol-
ogy. Hwang and Jo [18] used a modified HAZOP-R (Railway)
method in combination with a Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(see [5, chap. 5]) to identify hazardous events for a railway
signaling system. Trains mainly differ from vehicles because
they are moving on rails and are coordinated by a central
system. In our adaption the HAZOP-item is one skill of
the categories perception, planning or action. The system
parameters have to be defined according to the chosen skill.
For example Perceive objects has parameters like relative
position, extent and speed for detected objects. At this point
we introduce keywords for the skill categories as follows:
• Perception skills: No, nonexistent, erroneous, too large,
too small
• Planning skills: Not relevant, Relevant {parameter e.g.
object} not, conflicting, physically not possible
• Action skills: Absent, wrong, unattended, too large, too
small
We used the keywords to generate possible malfunctions for
each skill in combination with a parameter of the skill. For
example, we used plan trajectory (skill) planned a physically
not possible (keyword) turn rate (parameter) in the trajectory.
The chosen categories fit for the reduced use case and system
complexity of the unmanned protective vehicle. Vehicle guid-
ance systems with a wider functional range may need more
detailed categories to declare usable guide words.
C. Scenes
Ulbrich et. al [3] recently reviewed many definitions of the
term scene and defined a consolidated definition as:
“A scene describes a snapshot of the environment including
the scenery and dynamic elements, as well as all actors and
observers self-representations, and the relationships among
those entities. Only a scene representation in a simulated world
can be all-encompassing (objective scene, ground truth). In the
real world it is incomplete, incorrect, uncertain, and from one
or several observers points of view (subjective scene).”
Thus, a scene consists of the three main parts dynamic el-
ements, scenery and self-representations of actors and ob-
servers as shown in Fig. 6. For the purpose of defining scenes
for the unmanned protective vehicle we chose the following
entities:
• Road infrastructure
• Road infrastructure width
• Road infrastructure curvature
• Traffic constellation
• Maximum velocity of moving traffic
• Weather conditions
• Object constellation on hard shoulder
Scene
Moving elements
• Moving objects‘ states and attributes
• Moving model-incompliant information
Self-representations of actors and observers
• Skills and abilities, e.g., field of view or occlusions
• Actors‘/observers‘ states and attributes
Scenery
• Lane network (lanes, conflict areas, …)
• Stationary elements (obstacles, curbs, traffic
signs, traffic light positions, model-incompliant
information, …)
• Vertical elevation
• Environment conditions
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Fig. 6. Parts of a scene according to [3]
• Driving state of the unmanned protective vehicle
• Malfunction as part of self-representation
The selected entities describe the operational environment for
the reduced operating scenario of the unmanned protective
vehicle and were identified by using information from the
item definition. Road infrastructures are described by a right
and a left infrastructure in relation to the unmanned protec-
tive vehicle. We added additional information to the scenes
which exceed the functional system boundaries according to
the item definition. This will be used to identify potential
hazardous events, in which the vehicle has no malfunctions
but is operated outside these boundaries. These scenes can
lead to mishaps without a malfunction or functional error
and can be declared as a system boundary consideration.
The next challenge is to choose a level of discretization for
each component of the scene. As the hazard identification
aims at generating top-level system hazards, we chose to use
nearly binary discretization. Choosing an appropriate level of
discretization is a crucial step because too-detailed scenes can
distort the risk assessment. Very detailed scenes are more
improbable than top level scenes and result in a lower exposure
rating and this leading to a lower automotive safety integrity
level (ASIL) [2, Part 3] classification. We choose a high level
of discretization because the generated scenes shall provide
a base for an expert team predicting the systems behavior
in a given scene. In our case the road infrastructures have
solid markings, dashed markings, guardrails and turf. The
infrastructure width, infrastructure curvature and the weather
conditions were set to valid or invalid. The traffic constellation
and the maximum velocity is chosen to moving traffic with
no limitation according to the item definition. The object
constellation on the hard shoulder can contain no object, solid
object (like a car) or vulnerable object. The driving state of
the unmanned protective vehicle is either stopped, driving at
10 km/h or driving at 80 km/h. This level of detail allows a
very simplified and qualitative consideration of the operational
scenes.
D. Database
After identifying all necessary components to describe
events we have to generate the potential hazardous events.
For this step we created a SQL-database, where a permutation
of all scenes is stored. To analyze only relevant events, the
database filtered scenes with following the constraints:
• the function is not performed in the operating mode,
• multiple failures or functional system boundary exceeding
or a combination of both exist,
• the malfunction is not relevant in scene (e.g. relevant
object not considered in the scene where no objects are
in place).
In conformity with the ISO 26262 standard, multiple failures
are not selected as relevant. A functional system boundary ex-
ceedance is interpreted as a single failure for this contribution.
The relevant potential hazardous events then give an operating
scene of the vehicle with a malfunction or system boundary
exceeding in a defined operating mode as shown in Table I.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF A POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS EVENT
Mode Follow Mode
Function Select relevant object
Malfunction Relevant object not considered
Road infrastructure Solid line (left) and turf (right)
Object constellation Vulnerable object
Curvature, width and weather valid
Traffic constellation Moving traffic with no limitation
Driving state Driving at 10 km/h
The scene in Table I was classified as hazardous because
the vulnerable object, which can be either a human or an
animal, would be injured if the vehicle does not stop. Based
on these hazardous events, the top-level system hazards can
be identified and afterwards be assessed in the risk assessment
step of the HARA.
V. RESULTS
The number of scenes created for the unmanned protective
vehicle according to the discretization from Section IV-C is
145 with 108 scenes classified as relevant. This classification
is based on whether there is no or only one system boundary
exceedance. We identified 16 functions with 37 malfunctions
and the four operating modes for creation of the potential
hazardous events. Table II shows the numbers of generated and
filtered events of the database. The great decrease after filtering
all generated events to relevant events can be explained by
four factors shown in Table III. The first point of automated
reduction is decided by whether a specific function is operated
in a certain operating mode. In Manual Mode a roadworker is
driving the unmanned protective vehicle like a normal truck,
thus only acting skills are used in Manual Mode and the num-
ber of relevant events is significantly reduced. Safe Halt and
Coupled Mode are using a reduced set of system functionality
TABLE II
NUMBERS OF GENERATED AND CLASSIFIED EVENTS
Mode Events Relevant Hazardous
Manual Mode 5328 373 238
Safe Halt 5328 344 105
Follow Mode 5328 377 170
Coupled Mode 5328 368 237
TABLE III
MAJOR FACTORS OF FILTERING RELEVANT EVENTS
The function with a specific malfunction is not performed in
operating mode
Manual Mode Safe Halt Follow Mode Coupled Mode
2592 864 0 648
Only one malfunction or system boundary exceedance is allowed
Manual Mode Safe Halt Follow Mode Coupled Mode
864 720 1296 864
The combination of malfunction and scene is (physically) invalid
Manual Mode Safe Halt Follow Mode Coupled Mode
1331 666 666 666
Scene is not relevant for operating mode
Manual Mode Safe Halt Follow Mode Coupled Mode
0 2664 2664 2664
as both do not perceive lane boundaries and Safe Halt not even
objects.
Second influence on the number of relevant events is the selec-
tion of only one malfunction or system boundary exceedance.
This criterion comes from the ISO 26262 standard where only
single point of failures are considered. The number of relevant
events will increase significantly, if two or more malfunctions
are evaluated.
Due to automated generation of the events without any phys-
ical or formal modeling, there are plenty of events which are
(physically) not possible or just not meaningful. For example
is an event with the malfunction existing object not recognized
in a scene where no object is located on the hard shoulder not
meaningful.
Last of all some scenes are not possible for some operating
modes. The reduction of 2664 events in all automated oper-
ating modes is explained by scenes where the velocity of the
unmanned protective vehicle is at 80 km/h. This state is only
relevant for Manual Mode as the maximum velocity in the
automated modes is limited to 10 km/h.
The relevant events then were assessed by a team of experts
as to whether they are hazardous or not. We can not provide
proof of completeness since the development process is still
on-going and to the best of our knowledge there is no measure
for completeness. For validation purposes, a next step is to
compare the resulting hazards from this approach with the
identified hazards by a team of experts.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The generated potential hazardous events and the (plausi-
bility) filtering in a database result in a systematic way to
identify top level system hazards for an unmanned protective
vehicle with a very limited use case but the first planned
unmanned operation in public traffic. A drawback of the
proposed method is that there are several events leading to the
same hazards and the same ASIL classification. For example
the infrastructure width does not have any impact on how
the actuating skills, like accelerating the vehicle, perform.
This topic can be addressed by using equivalence classes for
parts of a scene towards selected skills and with this reduce
the total number of events by not loosing information about
critical events. A difficulty in choosing equivalence classes is
to prove that no potential hazardous event is omitted. These
equivalence classes could be identified by having a look at
skill categories with regard to single parts or categories of
the overall scene definition. Another focus is to extend this
method for vehicle guidance systems with a wider use case,
like the project Stadtpilot [19]. The first step for this purpose
is to generate an item definition and to describe the operational
environment in inner cities. Due to the situational complexity
of this environment the functions for evaluating and reducing
the total number of events must be extended because there is
a huge amount of possible events.
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